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1. Scope of this paper. 
 
On February 21st 2006 the European Court of Justice delivered its ruling in Halifax1. 
“Halifax day” has been considered as marking the beginning of a new stage of evolution 
of the European VAT system2. Therefore the facts, the opinion of Advocate General 
Mr. Miguel Poiares Maduro3 and the ruling itself have generated a great amount of 
interest among European commentators4.  These contributions focus on a very wide 
range of topics related to the case and, generally, to VAT avoidance. Nevertheless even 
though great progress has been made on these issues the time has come for a more 
detailed analysis of the case. 
 
Leaving out other highly interesting topics, this paper will merely focus on one logical  
weakness of Halifax which has been already  noted by some commentators5, but not in 
our opinion resolved. We are referring, in fact, to one element of the “two-part test” 
                                                
1 ECJ judgment of 21 February 2006 in Case C-255/02 Halifax plc v CC & E. 
2 J. Swinkels, “Halifax day: Abuse of Law in European VAT” [2006] International VAT Monitor, May- 
June 173 at p.173. 
3 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 7 April 2005. Halifax plc, Leeds 
Permanent Development Services Ltd and County Wide Property Investments Ltd v Commissioners of 
Customs & Excise. Case C-255/02. European Court reports 2006 Page I-01609. 
4 Both in critical and praiseworthy taste: M. Lang, “Rechtsmissbrauch und Gemeinschaftsrecht im Lichte 
von Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes” [2006] Steuer und Wirtschaft International 273. H.F. Lange, 
“Rechtsmissbrauch im Mehrwertsteuerrecht” [2006] Der Betrieb 519. R. De La Feria, “Giving 
themselves extra VAT? The ECJ Ruling in Halifax” [2006] BTR 119. B. Lask, “Banks, Universities and 
Hospitals: the limits to tax avoidance” (2006) 8, Issue 2, The EC Tax Journal 39. C. Piccolo, “Abuso del 
diritto ed Iva: tra interpretazione comunitaria ed applicazione nazionale” [2006] Rassegna Tributaria 
1040. S. Douma; F. Engelen, “Halifax plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners: the ECJ Applies the 
Abuse of Rights Doctrine in Vat Cases” [2006] BTR 429. F. Vanistendael, “Halifax and Cadbury 
Schweppes: one single European theory of abuse in tax law? [2006] EC Tax Review 192. I. Massin, 
“Introduction of Halifax in the Belgian VAT Legislation” [2006] International VAT Monitor, September-
October 336. H. McCarthy, “Abuse of rights: The Effect of the Doctrine on VAT Planning” [2007] BTR 
160. M.P. Bonet Sánchez, “Abuso del derecho comunitario a deducir el IVA soportado en los asuntos 
«Halifax» y «Huddersfield» [2007], No 6 Jurisprudencia Tributaria Aranzadi 25. Even before 
deliverance of the ruling and/or opinion of the AG: P. Brennan, “Why the ECJ Should Not Follow 
Advocate General Maduro’s Opinion in Halifax” [2005] International VAT Monitor, Juli-August 247. M. 
Ridsdale, “Abuse of rights, fiscal neutrality and VAT” [2005] EC Tax Review 82. R. Cordara, “Halifax: a 
conservative opinion” [2005] BTR 267. R. de la Feria, “The European Court of Justice’s solution to 
aggressive VAT planning – further towards legal uncertainty?” [2006] EC Tax Review 27.  
5 See: Ridsdale, “Abuse of rights, fiscal neutrality and VAT” [2005] EC Tax Review 82 at 88 et seq. R. de 
la Feria, “The European Court of Justice’s solution to aggressive VAT planning – further towards legal 
uncertainty?” [2006] EC Tax Review 27 at 32.  
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applied in order to determine the existence of abuse of law: the so called teleological or 
objective element. It has been described as follows in relation to Halifax: “where there 
is no contradiction between recognition of the claim made by the taxable person and the 
aims and results pursued by the legal provision invoked, no abuse can be asserted”6; 
and in the ECJ ruling: “…an abusive practice can be found to exist only if, first, the 
transactions concerned, notwithstanding formal application of the conditions laid down 
by the relevant provisions of the Sixth Directive and the national legislation transposing 
it, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary to the 
purpose of those provisions”7. Furthermore, in the second part of this article, we try to 
demonstrate that the teleological element is essential to any tax avoidance doctrine. 
The teleological analysis of this case could finish at this stage by stating that to allow 
taxable persons to deduct all input VAT even though, in the context of their normal 
commercial operations, no transactions conforming with the deduction rules of the Sixth 
Directive or of the national legislation transposing it would have enabled them to deduct 
such VAT, or would have allowed them to deduct only a part, would be contrary to the 
principle of fiscal neutrality and, therefore, contrary to the purpose of those rules8. This 
position seems to be shared by quite a lot of commentators9.  
Nevertheless, and this is in my opinion the crucial problem in Halifax, these 
contributions fail to recognise the purpose -or more precisely the lack of purpose- of the 
allegedly avoided rules. One should bear in mind that the whole VAT structure in 
Halifax was designed for the purpose of recovering a maximum percentage of the input 
tax on the construction of four call centres, avoiding a 5 per cent recovery limit of VAT 
under partial exemption rules arising  because Halifax was a banking company whose 
supplies were  predominantly exempt financial services. On the other hand, and this is 
perhaps frequently forgotten, the VAT rules limiting the right to deduct when 
exemptions apply, are considered normally inconsistent with principles governing the 
EU VAT system such as fiscal neutrality and VAT as consumption tax10. These facts 
give raise to a curious paradox: the avoidance of certain VAT rules might be the only 
way to adhere to the  principles of the VAT system11.  
Therefore, the third and fourth parts of this paper will focus on these issues. In a first 
step we will try to prove how rules limiting the right to deduct may culminate in treating 
6 Advocate’s General’s Opinión on Halifax, at para. 88. 
7 Paragraph 74 of the judgment. 
8 Paragraph 80 of the judgment. 
9 V. Ruiz Almendral, “Tax Avoidance and the European Court of Justice: What is at Stake for European 
General Anti-Avoidance Rules?” (2005) 33 Intertax 562 at 579 et seq. Cordara, “Halifax: a conservative 
opinion” [2005] BTR 267 at 260. C. Piccolo, “Abuso del diritto ed Iva: tra interpretazione comunitaria ed 
applicazione nazionale” [2006] Rassegna Tributaria 1040 at 1046. S. Douma; F. Engelen, “Halifax plc v 
Customs and Excise Commissioners: the ECJ Applies the Abuse of Rights Doctrine in Vat Cases” [2006] 
BTR 429 at 433 et seq. M.P. Bonet Sánchez, “Abuso del derecho comunitario a deducir el IVA soportado 
en los asuntos «Halifax» y «Huddersfield» [2007], No 6 Jurisprudencia Tributaria Aranzadi 25 at 27. 
And it has been also the position assumed by the AG: Advocate’s General’s Opinión on Halifax, at para. 
93 et seq. 
10 R. de la Feria, “The European Court of Justice’s solution to aggressive VAT planning – further towards 
legal uncertainty?” [2006] EC Tax Review 27 at 32.  
11 In fact, this is not an isolated problem. See for social grounded exemptions: A. Báez Moreno and D. 
Marín Barnuevo, “La tributación de las federaciones deportivas”, in Manual de Gestión de Federaciones 
Deportivas (Alberto Palomar Olmeda (ed), Thomson-Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2006) at 254 et seq.  
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traders as de facto consumers, creating tax cascading and encouraging self-supplies12. 
Finally we will try to offer a solution for this and similar cases on VAT; we will 
demonstrate thereby that this problem is not that new in fact, since German scholars 
have been dealing with it –from a strict theoretical point of view- during the last 
decades. 
 
2. The teleological element: an explicit or hidden requirement in every tax 
avoidance solution. 
 
European (and non-European) countries have had different reactions to the tax 
avoidance phenomenon. Nevertheless, and despite the diversity of general tax avoidance 
“solutions”13, there are common structural elements14, among which the teleological 
element is worth noting. It has been stated, in fact, that the first and most important 
common element to all GAARs is that they provide an instrument for the tax 
administration to recharacterize a given arrangement by interpreting the tax legislation 
according to its purpose15. 
 
Briefly, tax avoidance comes up under two different schemes. Either the taxpayer 
avoids application of burdensome tax statutes or, on the other hand, accrues a tax 
advantage by causing application of beneficial tax provisions16. Regardless of which 
GAAR might be applied, the purpose of the avoided or applied provision will be 
decisive, as we will try to demonstrate next. 
 
Most countries make a distinction between substance over form techniques and separate 
anti-avoidance rules17. The former, if applicable, require a purposive analysis of the 
avoided or  applied legislation. Whatever the technique may be (Wirtschaftliche 
Betrachtungsweise in Germany18, independent fiscal qualification in the Netherlands19, 
                                                
12 Which are the effects normally linked to rules limiting the right to deduct. See: R. de la Feria, “The 
European Court of Justice’s solution to aggressive VAT planning – further towards legal uncertainty?” 
[2006] EC Tax Review 27 at 32. 
13 Hereby we refer not only to statute-based but also to court-based general tax avoidance rules. 
14 In Spain Prof. PALAO has insisted on these structural elements minimizing the importance of specific 
legal conditions. See: C. Palao, “La norma anti-elusión del proyecto de nueva Ley General Tributaria” 
(2003) 248 Estudios Financieros Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación 71 at p. 83. See also the 
comparative study of the legislation of Belgium, Germany, France, the UK and the Netherlands carried 
out by de Kleer: M. de Kleer, “Towards a European Anti-Abuse Doctrine in Direct Taxation?” [1996] 
Intertax 137. 
15 See Ruiz Almendral (2005), fn. 9, at p. 567. 
16 These two schemes, known by German scholars as rule-avoidance (Tatbestandvermeidung) and rule-
catch (Tatbestanderschleichung), are described in: K.D. Drüen, “§ 42. Miβbrauch von 
Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten”, in K Tipke and H.W. Kruse (eds) Abgabenordnung. Finanzgerichtsordnung. 
Kommentar zur AO un FGO (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 1961/2007) at § 42, Rz. 47, Lfg. 88 September 1999. 
For more details and further literature see: L. Dong-Sik, Methoden zur Verhinderung der Steuerumgehung 
und ihr Verhältnis zueinander (GCA-Verlag, Herdecke, 2000) at 30 et seq.  
17 See: M. de Kleer, “Towards a European Anti-Abuse Doctrine in Direct Taxation?” [1996] Intertax 137 
at 139. 
18 German literature about Wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise is huge. For a general analysis with many 
references: K.D. Drüen, “§ 4. Gesetz”, in K Tipke and H.W. Kruse (eds) Abgabenordnung. 
Finanzgerichtsordnung. Kommentar zur AO un FGO (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 1961/2007) at § 4, Rz. 47320 
et seq, Lfg. 111 Oktober 2006. 
19 M. de Kleer, “Towards a European Anti-Abuse Doctrine in Direct Taxation?” [1996] Intertax 137 at 
141. 
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acte anormal de gestion in France20 or simply teleological interpretation) the method is 
more or less homogenous. Taking into account that the wording of a legal provision 
might be attributed different meanings, an avoidance attempt might be rejected by 
choosing a meaning appropriate to the purpose of the very avoided or applied 
provision21. When dealing with general anti-avoidance rules the teleological element 
might not be so evident. 
Some statute or court based general anti-avoidance rules include the teleological 
element as an explicit application requirement. In this understanding we could mention 
the old Spanish GAAR in force up to July 1st 2004 (“To avoid fraus legis, there shall 
not be deemed to be an extension of the taxable event when the tax is claimed with 
respect to events, acts or legal contracts which have been performed with the intention 
of avoiding the payment of the tax, relying on provisions enacted for a different 
purpose, provided the result they produce shall be equivalent to that derived from the 
taxable event”22 or the Dutch court-based fraus legis doctrine which requires as a 
condition that the choice of legal form conflicts with the purpose and intent of the (tax) 
law23. Nevertheless, this is unusual at least with regard to statute-based general anti-
avoidance rules. By way of example, let us analyze the Spanish and German GAAR, 
which have been considered to share many features.24 
 
Section 15 of the Spanish Ley General Tributaria defines a “conflict” in the application 
of tax provisions as follows: 
 
“When the taxpayer succeeds in totally or partially avoiding the tax, or obtains a 
tax benefit of any kind through acts or arrangements in which both the following 
circumstances occur: (a) Individually considered or, as a group such acts are 
clearly artificial or improper for attaining the pursued economic objective; (b) 
That no other substantial consequences arise from the adoption of this legal 
form of arrangement as would have arisen had the normal, proper form be 
used”25.  
 
Paragraph 42 of the German Abgabenordnung reads: 
 
“The tax laws cannot be avoided by the misuse of legal construction 
opportunities. Where such a misuse is found, the tax consequences shall be such 
                                                
20 H. Lehérissel, “France”, in Form and Substance in tax law (Cahiers de droit fiscal international. 
Volume LXXXVIIa, Kluwer, The Hague, 2002) at 276 et seq. 
21 This construction as a logical limit to interpretation has been developed by German scholars: K. 
Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (6th ed, Berlin, Springer, 1991), at 342. K. Engisch, 
Einführung in das juristische Denken (5th ed., Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1971), at 146. 
22 Art 24 of the Ley General Tributaria as reworded by Law nº 25/1995 of July 20th. We take the 
translation from: M. Marín Arias and J.L. Pérez de Ayala, “Spain”, in Form and Substance in tax law 
(Cahiers de droit fiscal international. Volume LXXXVIIa, Kluwer, The Hague, 2002) at 517. 
23 See: L.H. Ijzerman, “The Netherlands” in Form and Substance in tax law (Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international. Volume LXXXVIIa, Kluwer, The Hague, 2002) at 454. 
24 V. Ruiz Almendral and G. Seitz, “El fraude a la ley tributaria (Análisis de la normas española con 
ayuda de la experiencia alemana” (2004) 257-258 Estudios Financieros. Revista de Contabilidad y 
Tributación 7. Ruiz Almendral (2005), fn. 9, at p. 562. V. Ruiz Almendral, El fraude a la ley tributaria a 
examen. Los problemas de aplicación práctica de la norma general anti-fraude del artículo 15 de la LGT 
a los ámbitos nacional y comunitario (Pamplona, Aranzadi, 2006), at 79. 
25 We take the translation from: Ruiz Almendral (2005), fn. 9, at p. 563. 
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as would follow from a legal construction that is appropriate to the economic 
circumstances.”26.  
 
As we stated before the teleological element does not appear as an explicit application 
requirement in these and similar GAARs. Nevertheless as we try to demonstrate it is a 
“hidden” element in every tax avoidance solution. It is a widespread opinion among 
European scholars that GAARs are nothing different from application by analogy or 
teleological reduction27 of the avoided or  applied provisions28. If this finding is correct, 
the existence of a teleological element seems to be evident taking into account that both 
analogy and teleological reduction require a purposive analysis. Nevertheless we do not 
think it is necessary to resort to these thoughts in order to prove the teleological element 
inherent to GAARs29. To reflect on the very nature of the tax avoidance phenomenon  
will be more than enough. 
 
As has been stated, tax avoidance schemes make use of the relation between the words 
of a provision and its purpose (the ability to pay which is supposed to be taxed). In the 
case of avoided tax provisions, the letter of the statute is not fulfilled but the abusive act 
or arrangement falls within the purpose of the provision. Alternatively, in using 
beneficial tax provisions, the relation works the other way round: the letter of the statute 
is fulfilled but the abusive act or arrangement does not fall within the purpose of the 
beneficial provision30. Therefore, the teleological element is just a logical requirement. 
We might not detect any kind of avoidance if an arrangement falls within the purpose of 
a provision (i.e. according to the purpose of a beneficial statute the arrangement should 
be benefited or according to the purpose of a burdensome provision the arrangements 
should not be taxed). 
 
For that reason one should agree with the Halifax ruling and the Opinion of Mr 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro, at least on the whole, when requiring a teleological 
element as a part of the avoidance test. Nevertheless, the question becomes more 
problematic if we analyze the facts and the “avoided/ applied provisions” in Halifax.   
 
3. Applied and avoided provisions in Halifax. Is there any purpose in the limitation 
of the right to deduct? 
 
The facts in Halifax match perfectly with the second avoidance structure defined above: 
the taxpayer accrues a tax advantage by causing application of beneficial tax provisions. 
Ordinarily Halifax would only have been able to recover a 5% of the VAT incurred on 
                                                
26 We take the translation from: V. Thuronyi, “Rules in OECD Countries to Prevent Avoidance of 
Corporate Income Tax”. Available at: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/soken/jst2002p3.pdf (last visit: July, 
31, 2008).  
27 For an explanation of the concept of teleological reduction see: C.W. Canaris, “Die Festellung von 
Lücken im Gesetz” (2nd ed. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1983), at 132 et seq. 
28 See with further references from German and Spanish commentators: K. Tipke, “Die 
Steuerrechtsordnung. Band III: Föderative Steuerverteilung , Rechtsanwendung und Rechtschutz, 
Gestalter der Steuerrechtsordnung (Köln, Dr. Otto Schmidt, 1993), at 1325 et seq. V. Ruiz Almendral and 
G. Seitz, “El fraude a la ley tributaria (Análisis de la normas española con ayuda de la experiencia 
alemana” (2004) 257-258 Estudios Financieros. Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación 20 et seq. 
29 Specially being this a controversial issue. For the discussion in Germany between the followers of the 
Innentheorie and Auβentheorie see: P. Fischer, “§ 42 Missbrauch von rechtlichen 
Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten” in Hübschmann, Hepp, Spitaler (eds.) Kommentar zur Abgabenordnung und 
Finanzgerichtsordnung (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 1951/2006) at § 42, Rz. 77 et seq, Lfg. 197 März 2008.   
30 K Tipke (1993), fn 28, at 1324. 
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the purchase of construction related supplies, since the majority of his services were 
exempt. The insertion of additional companies enabled Halifax to recover all the input 
VAT incurred31. In that context it was logical for the ECJ and the AG to analyze the 
purposes and the objectives of the Sixth Directive governing the right to deduction. 
 
AG Poaires Maduro points out in his opinion: 
 
“The right of a taxable person to deduct from the output VAT payable the input 
VAT incurred for making the taxable supplies constitutes a corollary of the 
principle of neutrality. Correspondingly the same principle requires that a 
taxable person must not be entitled to deduct or recover the input VAT paid on 
supplies received for its exempted transactions”32. 
 
The ECJ indicates along the same line: 
 
“It must be borne in mind that the deduction system under the Sixth Directive is 
meant to relieve the trader entirely of the burden of the VAT payable or paid in 
the course of all his economic activities. The common system of VAT 
consequently ensures complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities. 
[…] Article 2 of First Council Directive…and article 17 (2), (3) and (5) of the 
Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that, in principle, the existence of 
a direct and immediate link between a particular input transaction and a 
particular output transaction…is necessary before the taxable person is entitled 
to deduct input VAT. […] To allow taxable persons to deduct all input VAT even 
though, in the context of their normal commercial operations, no transactions 
conforming with the deduction rules of the Sixth Directive or of the national 
legislation transposing it would have enabled the to deduct such VAT, or would 
have allowed the to deduct only a part, would be contrary to the principle of 
fiscal neutrality and, therefore, contrary to the purpose of these rules”. 
 
Even if some of these arguments might be accepted, several logical weaknesses should 
be pointed out: 
 
a) The exposed purposive analysis could be considered incomplete. By every rule-catch 
avoidance structure the teleological element must be analysed in relation to different 
provisions: firstly in relation to the applied provision (i.e., in our case, the one 
regulating the right of a taxable person to deduct input VAT incurred) this analysis has 
been carried out by the ECJ and the AG; but secondly, and perhaps more important, the 
avoided provision should also to be considered. However, in Halifax we cannot find 
even a single reference to the purpose of the rules limiting the right to deduct when 
exemptions apply. As we might see later, this analysis could have been an arduous 
task33, since these rules simply lack purpose. 
 
                                                
31 The “catch-avoidance strategy” normally involves an ordinary avoidance behaviour. In Halifax, in 
order to recover all the input VAT incurred (VAT deduction rule caught) the rule limiting tax deduction 
for exempt activities must be avoided. 
32 Paragraph 93 of the Advocate General’s opinion.  
33 As stated by some commentators: R. de la Feria, “The European Court of Justice’s solution to 
aggressive VAT planning – further towards legal uncertainty?” [2006] EC Tax Review 27 at 32. 
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b) As stated before, the Sixth Directive ensures neutrality of taxation entitling taxable 
persons to deduct all input VAT incurred in the course of their economic activities, 
provided that they are themselves subject to VAT. But this does not mean that where 
economic activities are totally or partially VAT exempt, a right to deduct all input VAT 
would be contrary to the principle of fiscal neutrality. In fact, the ECJ and AG Poiares 
have not put forward a single argument for this supposed violation. The only grounds 
for the “neutrality argument” is to be found in the decision of the VAT and Duties 
Tribunal in Halifax when considering that as the appellant in that case enabled itself “to 
build call centres more cheaply than any other bank or financial institution that did not 
adopt a comparable tax avoidance scheme which in turn, enabled it to provide services 
to its costumers more cheaply than its non-tax avoiding competitors”34. Several 
arguments have been set out against this finding35. Nevertheless, we will focus on the 
most important one which is inextricably linked to the leit motive of this article: the 
purpose –more precisely the lack of it- of the rules limiting the right to deduct when 
exemptions apply. 
 
As we have stated before, the ECJ and the AG Poiares focus on the neutrality principle 
as the only scope of the whole VAT system, in general, and the right to deduct in 
particular. This way of thinking ignores the fact that VAT is a tax on consumption36 
treating and constructing it, in a certain way, as a “tax on enterprises”; and, what is 
worse, it leads to the fallacy of “neutrality (equality) in unfairness”. The reasoning, in 
short, might be the following: given that some taxable persons might not deduct the 
input VAT paid on supplies received for its exempted transactions, every taxable person 
performing VAT exempted transactions must be denied the right to deduct. And hence 
we arrive to the real key issue of the Halifax case i.e. the rule limiting the right to 
deduct when exemptions apply. 
 
When a taxable person performing exempt transactions is legally denied the right to 
deduct input VAT paid, two things might occur: 
 
a) The taxable person might not be able to charge non-deductible VAT in price, turning 
thereby into de facto final consumer and frustrating the very nature of VAT37. 
 
b) The taxable person might be able to charge non-deductible VAT in the price. In this 
case we would also have a range of possibilities.  
 
If the exempt transaction is located in the last stage of production or distribution, with 
non-deductible VAT charged in price, the final consumer is taxed with “silent VAT”. 
This frustrates the scope of exemptions that become, as have been named by German 
                                                
34 Quoted by: Ridsdale, “Abuse of rights, fiscal neutrality and VAT” [2005] EC Tax Review 82 at 90. 
35 Ridsdale, “Abuse of rights, fiscal neutrality and VAT” [2005] EC Tax Review 82 at 88 et seq. R. de la 
Feria, “The European Court of Justice’s solution to aggressive VAT planning – further towards legal 
uncertainty?” [2006] EC Tax Review 27 at 32. 
36 See the excelent ECJ case law summary about this issue in: L. Dobratz, Leistung und Entgelt im 
Europäischen Umsatzsteuerrecht (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 2005) at 22 et seq. 
37 Nevertheless, as German scholars have indicated, this is an unlikely case: H.G. Ruppe, “Unechte 
Umsatzsteuerbefreiung”, in Die Steuerrechtsordnung in der Diskussion. Festschrift für Klaus Tipke zum 
70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 1995) at 461. W. Reiβ, “Einführung UStG”, in Reiβ, Kraeusel, 
Langer (eds.) Umsatzsteuergesetz. Kommentar (Stollfuβ, Stuttgart, 1995) at Band I, Rz. 46, Erg.-
Lfg./Dezember 2007. H. Stadie, “Einführung zum Umsatzsteuer”, in Rau, Dürrwachter, Flick, Geist (eds.) 
Umsatzsteuergesetz Kommentar (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 2007) at Band I, Rz. 133, Lfg. 129 Februar 2007. 
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scholars, false exemptions (unechte Steuerbefreiungen)38. In fact the exemption is just 
limited to the value added by the taxable person who performs the exempt transaction39. 
 
If, on the other hand, the exempt transaction is located in an intermediate stage of 
production or distribution it may generate a tax cascading effect. If a taxable person 
performs a taxed supply to another taxable person who performs exempt transactions, 
this will charge non-deductible VAT in price to the next trader. In the next stage 
(subject to tax and last in the chain) a taxable person will charge VAT to the final 
consumer calculating the tax base proportionally to the price which includes VAT 
charged by the previous trader40. This might generate a “tax on tax effect” whose 
avoidance was one of the basic reasons behind the introduction of a Community VAT 
system41. 
 
Therefore, whatever the behaviour of the taxpayer performing exempt transactions may 
be, the limitation of the right to deduct will lead to consequences that conflict with well 
established VAT tax principles. This limitation of the right to deduct has been 
consequently considered contrary to the very purpose of the VAT-system 
(systemwidrig)42. And these inconsistencies might be even worse in the Halifax case, 
taking into account the common idea that exemptions for financial services are due to 
the lack of consumption by which they are characterized43. 
 
Thus arises the difficulty in applying the teleological element to the Halifax case. 
Which is the goal of the rules limiting the right to deduct when exemptions apply? The 
search will be unsuccessful44, unless we assume that this limit has been stated with a 
view to raising revenue or, in other words, with a view to recovering the loss of revenue 
associated normally to any tax exemption. And the question is: is the pure revenue-
raising goal appropriate for a teleological analysis? This will be considered in the next 
paragraph. 
                                                
38 Using this term: : H.G. Ruppe, “Unechte Umsatzsteuerbefreiung”, in Die Steuerrechtsordnung in der 
Diskussion. Festschrift für Klaus Tipke zum 70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 1995) 457. 
39 H. Stadie, “Einführung zum Umsatzsteuer”, in Rau, Dürrwachter, Flick, Geist (eds.) 
Umsatzsteuergesetz Kommentar (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 2007) at Band I, Rz. 133, Lfg. 129 Februar 2007. 
 
40 A graphic example might be found in: W. Reiβ, in Tipke, Lang (eds.) Steuerrecht. 18th ed. (Otto 
Schmidt, Köln, 2005), at 599. 
41 R. de la Feria, “The European Court of Justice’s solution to aggressive VAT planning – further towards 
legal uncertainty?” [2006] EC Tax Review 27 at 32. 
42 This is a common assumption among German scholars: W. Reiβ, in Tipke, Lang (eds.) Steuerrecht. 18th 
ed. (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 2005), at 598. W. Reiβ, “Einführung UStG”, in Reiβ, Kraeusel, Langer (eds.) 
Umsatzsteuergesetz. Kommentar (Stollfuβ, Stuttgart, 1995) at Band I, Rz. 26, Erg.-Lfg./Dezember 2007. . 
H. Stadie, “Einführung zum Umsatzsteuer”, in Rau, Dürrwachter, Flick, Geist (eds.) Umsatzsteuergesetz 
Kommentar (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 2007) at Band I, Rz. 200, Lfg. 129 Februar 2007 (and literature quoted 
there). P. Kirchhof , “40 Jahre Umsatzsteuergesetz – Eine Steuer im Umbruch” [2008] Deutsches 
Steuerrecht 1 at 8. 
43 This is a highly disputed issue but several financial services are considered not to be consumptive but 
just a preparation for consumption. See: H. Friedrich-Vache, “Plädoyer für die Abschaffung unechter 
Befreiungen im Finanzdienstleistungsbereich – Mit Ausnahme der Verwahrung im Einlagengeschäft” 
[2006] Umsatzsteuer-Rundschau 207 at 208 et seq. 
44 See in fact the “ground” offered by the German legislator in Umsatzsteuergesetz 1967: “The exempt 
taxable person cannot be granted the right to deduct, appart from exceptions, because it seems 
inappropriate recovering VAT incurred in previous production stages, in sectors which do not perform 
taxable transactions” (quoted according to: H.G. Ruppe, “Unechte Umsatzsteuerbefreiung”, in Die 
Steuerrechtsordnung in der Diskussion. Festschrift für Klaus Tipke zum 70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, 
Köln, 1995) at 458). The tautology seems evident. 
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4. Pure-revenue raising provisions and tax avoidance. 
 
It is unusual for a tax provision to lack purpose. Therefore, tax scholars have not dealt 
with this problem very often. A general construction on this issue is not to be found 
among tax literature. 
 
One option could be to consider the crude revenue raising purpose and come to the 
conclusion that the proper interpretation is that which leads to a highest tax collection. 
This reasoning, similar to the classical in dubio pro fisco, seems totally unacceptable 
under logical and legal consideration45. Another option must be sought. 
 
In the late 1970s some German scholars developed a tax application theory which might 
be useful, if correctly understood, for the purposes of the Halifax case. The foundation 
upon which this theory is based seems easy: tax law provisions, save for regulatory and 
procedural ones, lack purpose apart from raising revenue. In this context, teleological 
interpretation seems to be excluded for tax law purposes46.  The key issue is then to  
understand the consequences of this lack of purpose for the application of tax law 
provisions.  
 
Even if there is no unanimous consensus among scholars on the consequences of this 
particular view of tax provisions, most of them point out that a lack of purpose must 
lead to a special significance of “written law” in their interpretation47. It is far from clear 
                                                
45 It has been in fact a common criticism to teleological interpretation of tax laws: K. Vogel, “Die 
Besonderheit des Steuerrechts” in [1977] Deutsche Steuer Zeitung 5 at 9. G. Crezelius, Steuerrechtliche 
Rechtsanwendung und allgemeine Rechtsordnung. Grundlagen für eine liberale Besteurungspraxis (Neue 
Wirtschafts-Briefe, Berlin, 1983) at 128. K. Vogel, „Grundzüge des Finanzrechts des Grundgesetzes“ in  
Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  Band IV Finanzverfassung – 
Bundestaatliche Ordnung (J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds.), 2nd ed., Müller, Heidelberg, 1999) at 51. 
K.D. Drüen, “Zur Rechtsnatur des Steuerrechts und ihrem Einfluß auf die Rechtsanwendung” in 
Festschrift für Heinrich Wilhelm Kruse zum 70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 2001) at 200. 
46 H.W. Kruse, “Steuerzpezifische Gründe und Grenzen der Gesetzesbindung” in Grenzen der 
Rechtsfortbildung durch Rechtsprechung und Verwaltungsvorschriften im Steuerrecht (K. Tipke ed., Otto 
Schmidt, Köln, 1982) at 73. K. Vogel, “Die Besonderheit des Steuerrechts” in [1977] Deutsche Steuer 
Zeitung 5 at 8 et seq. G. Crezelius, Steuerrechtliche Rechtsanwendung und allgemeine Rechtsordnung. 
Grundlagen für eine liberale Besteurungspraxis (Neue Wirtschafts-Briefe, Berlin, 1983) at 128. K, 
Vogel, “Das ungeschriebene Finanzrecht des Grundgesetzes” in Gedächnisschrift für Wolfgang Martens. 
(De Gruyter, Berlin, 1987) at 268 et seq. K. Vogel, “Vergleich und Gesetzmäβigkeit der Verwaltung im 
Steuerrecht” in Handelsrecht und Steuerrecht. Festschrift für Dr. Dr. h.c. Georg Döllerer. (IDW, 
Düsseldorf, 1988) at 683 et seq. K. Vogel, „Grundzüge des Finanzrechts des Grundgesetzes“ in  
Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  Band IV Finanzverfassung – 
Bundestaatliche Ordnung (J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds.), 2nd ed., Müller, Heidelberg, 1999) at 48 et 
seq. K.D. Drüen, “Zur Rechtsnatur des Steuerrechts und ihrem Einfluß auf die Rechtsanwendung” in 
Festschrift für Heinrich Wilhelm Kruse zum 70. Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 2001) at 200. 
47 K, Vogel, “Das ungeschriebene Finanzrecht des Grundgesetzes” in Gedächnisschrift für Wolfgang 
Martens. (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1987) at 270. K. Vogel, “Vergleich und Gesetzmäβigkeit der Verwaltung 
im Steuerrecht” in Handelsrecht und Steuerrecht. Festschrift für Dr. Dr. h.c. Georg Döllerer. (IDW, 
Düsseldorf, 1988) at 684. K. Vogel, „Grundzüge des Finanzrechts des Grundgesetzes“ in  Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  Band IV Finanzverfassung – Bundestaatliche Ordnung (J. 
Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds.), 2nd ed., Müller, Heidelberg, 1999) at 49. In relation to the Halifax case: P. 
Brennan, “Why the ECJ Should Not Follow Advocate General Maduro’s Opinion in Halifax” [2005] 
International VAT Monitor, Juli-August 247 at 248. 
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what “written law” or “wording” means in a legal context48, but I think we should 
consider these expressions equivalent to private law concepts and formal structures in 
contrast to autonomous tax law concepts and material (economic) constructions. 
 
We cannot share this construction and its consequences in layman’s terms. The purpose 
of tax provisions is not just raising revenue but doing it in a certain way. And hence 
“secondary goals” come into play. As stated before, VAT is based upon several  
principles, among which its legal character as tax on consumption might play a 
significant role. Even in taxes whose relation to the ability to pay principle must be 
considered remote, secondary goals exist. They indicate the way in which tax legislators 
intend to distribute the tax burden and, consequently, provide operators with purposes 
that are suitable for a teleological interpretation. But, for the above mentioned reasons, 
rules limiting the right to deduct when exemptions apply lack these secondary goals and 
are even inconsistent with established VAT principles. If this is true, there is only one 
remaining solution: the avoided and  applied provisions must be interpreted formally. 
This solution, which entails the impossibility of correcting the operations carried out in 
Halifax and similar cases, must be considered both logical and unsatisfactory.  
 
“Unsatisfactory” because only a few taxpayers might be enabled to resort to knowledge 
and skills necessary to set up complicated tax avoidance schemes. This gives rise to 
inequalities, distortions and, in a nutshell, to the well known phenomenon of “silly 
taxes” (Dummensteuern) i.e. taxes that are only paid by misinformed or non advised 
taxpayers49. Nevertheless, in cases involving rules limiting the right to deduct when 
exemptions apply, the ECJ’s approach does not seem well-founded and, as it has been 
stated, it shifts the burden of the problem from the legislator to the tax payer, deterring 
Member States from taking appropriate measures against the causes of aggressive VAT 
planning50. 
 
In short, we should finish this contribution as we started it: bad laws make hard cases.      
  
                                                
48 We do not think a literal interpretation criterion exists. The words of a single provision represent the 
starting point for its interpretation. At most cases words might be polysemous, so a single provision might 
be attributed different meanings. Which of those is to be considered “literal” or  “written”? 
49 About the concept of “silla taxes” see: G. Rose, “Über die Enstehung von “Dummensteuern” un ihre 
Vermeidung” in Die Steuerrechtsordnung in der Diskussion. Festschrift für Klaus Tipke zum 70. 
Geburtstag (Otto Schmidt, Köln, 1995) at 153 et seq. 
50 Feria, “The European Court of Justice’s solution to aggressive VAT planning – further towards legal 
uncertainty?” [2006] EC Tax Review 27 at 34. 
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